innovation in a widely understood sense, 8 the article focuses on potential revolutions 9 of products, intermediaries or markets and the regulatory implications of such. The article will not examine in detail particular areas of fintech, but will draw from a range of examples and their key features. The disruptive potential of fintech will be discussed to highlight market themes, changes in legal technology and regulatory implications, in respect of (a) financial product development, (b) financial intermediation interfaces and/or (c) financial markets and value networks. In this way, we can critically appreciate to what extent and in what respects fintech is disruptive, and whether its disruption is relevant to financial regulatory objectives.
This overview article, which provides a framework for analysing the disruptive potential of fintech and regulatory implications, is envisaged to be an anchor for more specific pieces that examine particular areas of fintech in more detail. We believe that such a high level perspective is necessary so as to introduce a more coherent blueprint for regulatory thinking and design, avoiding silo-based and narrowly reactive approaches to increasingly complex financial innovation.
Part A of the article sketches the nature and development of financial innovation, outlining the drivers, achievements and dark sides of financial innovation. It critically suggests a framework of 'disruptive innovation' for understanding the regulatory implications of financial innovation. Financial innovation could be a flash in the pan or introduce enduring change, so the first indicia for regulatory implications could be the 'disruptive' nature of the financial innovation concerned. We introduce a framework for regulatory thinking and evaluation of 'disruptive finance'-in terms of the nature of the 'change' observed, its 'substitutive potential' and its 'structural impact'. Parts B, C and D then discuss these aspects as applied to selected fintech innovations in financial products, services and markets. Part E concludes.
A. A Framework for Disruptive Financial Innovation
Finance can be thought of as "a derivative of social and political needs, engineered by economic theories, computational and data driven technologies". 10 It is a conjuration of economic, legal and increasingly information-based technologies, but put simply, a means to meet certain ends. Hence, finance continually evolves through financial innovation, and the topical development of 'fintech' should be understood in that context. As Avgouleas points out, from fractional reserve banking to the rise of securities exchanges, from securitisation of assets to high frequency trading, financial innovation is an ongoing and unceasing phenomenon. 11 Financial innovation is driven by a mixture of firm-based characteristics and wider environment factors, as well as by individual incentives and entrepreneurial moments. Many financial innovations can also be thought of as 'disruptive' as they consumers. 30 For example, Kling points out that cost-effective fixed rate mortgages for consumers would not be possible without the financial innovation of interest rate hedging derivative products. 31 Empirical research has found that cost-savings for financial institutions derived from financial innovation are often passed onto investors and borrowers. 32 Financial innovation that transforms asset characteristics such as in terms of liquidity and marketability also help in broadening financing opportunities for borrowers whether households or corporations.
33
For example, the development of exchange-traded funds has improved liquidity and investor access to otherwise less liquid products. 34 At a more macro level, Beck et al show that financial innovation correlates with increases in a country's growth opportunities and GDP per capita, 35 and is important for emerging economies in their development. 36 On the other hand, the catalogue of potential social harms from financial innovation range from the micro-level to the systemic level. One of the key trends in financial innovation, more to be discussed shortly, is the increasing marketisation of financial assets. Although such marketisation promotes access and improves the liquidity characteristics of assets, the apparent benefits of marketisation are often oversold. A balanced view is not taken with regard to the changed nature or increased risks of the assets, such as in securitised products. Some perverse consequences of securitisation are a decline in lending standards, information asymmetry between investors and originators, and a failure to monitor the performance of underlying assets. 37 Often financial innovation is supported or permitted without due consideration for such unintended consequences.
Further, financial innovation could be used in predatory schemes or could be misused to further selfinterested and anti-social motivations. Financial innovation can be used to repackage riskier or less liquid assets into apparently risk-managed, liquid and highly desirable assets in order to exploit investors. Over-selling of such marginally suitable products could ultimately result in mis-selling scandals. 38 Further, financial innovation such as high frequency trading are a double-edged sword, as on the one hand it can facilitate lightning fast and efficient trading, and hence improves market 30 Chris Brummer,' Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation ' (2015) Finally, a number of commentators are of the view that financial innovation correlates with increased systemic risk for the financial and economic systems. Financial innovation often involves more credit creation. Such increases in leverage as a systemic phenomenon often creates greater risk for all participants in the financial and real economies, and could raise systemic fragility in the face of shocks or crises. 42 Further, financial innovation also produces more complexity, which makes systems and markets more susceptible to systemic effects. As identified by commentators, 43 complexity often exacerbates information asymmetry resulting in mispriced allocations in the market, asset bubbles, and painful corrections and market instability. Further, the marketisation aspect so prevalent in much of financial innovation causes assets to be subject to market risk and to behavioural reactions that exacerbate market risk. Such marketisation, which transforms assets from relationship-based ones to marketable ones, inevitably foregoes the erstwhile flexibility underlying relationship-based assets that can be beneficial for managing defaults and crises. 44 In sum, increases in financial fragility and systemic risk seem to be the trade-off for supporting financial innovation. Further, Blair also points out that financial innovation has created patterns of wealth distribution that are concentrated upon the financial elite while risks have correspondingly increased for ordinary investors. 45 As financial innovation seems to be a double-edged sword, and in Awrey's words, 'welfareindeterminate', 46 the regulatory engagement with financial innovation has always been one of relative passivity and catch-up. Regulators, cautious of not impeding the development of competitive innovation and choice for consumers, often dismantle regulatory barriers to support 39 In terms of price discovery and liquidity in generally well-traded stocks and in normal times, see more discussion in Part D. 40 competition, or refrain from adding such barriers. 47 This is because much of financial innovation depends on low cost and flexible models, which would be stifled by the high cost of regulation. 48 Thus, regulators often take a 'wait and see' approach, preferring to monitor developments regulating financial innovation. Regulators may also adopt informal approaches 49 or soft law, in order to be flexible in governing financial innovation. 50 However, such an approach risks prolonged regulatory inertia, 51 and would also mean that regulatory developments are reactive, with the possibility of swinging extremely to risk aversion if failures or scandals arise.
After the global financial crisis 2007-9, global regulators now disfavour an excessively laissez-faire or reactive approach in financial regulation. 52 They have developed more forward-looking regulatory frameworks to monitor and sometimes pre-empt certain developments. previous regulatory gaps, 57 regulators seem willing to take more formal steps in regulatory governance over shadow banking developments 58 or limiting certain transactions to the wholesale sector, 59 so as to introduce forms of proportionate governance without excessive regulation. The evolution of financial regulation has come a long way from merely being facilitative of market efficiency 60 to a point where other public interest objectives pervade, such as financial and market stability. The regulatory regime has become a bedrock of the financial sector architecture itself. Hence financial innovation is necessarily studied within the paradigm of regulatory implications.
In this new phase of regulatory dynamics vis a vis financial innovation, this article proposes that 'disruptive innovation' could provide a framework for considering the regulatory implications of fintech. 61 We argue that it is helpful to develop a high-level framework that provides some indicia for considering whether and to what extent regulatory intervention in financial innovation should take place. We draw from general business innovation literature to derive such insights that can be of enduring value.
Disruptive Innovation as a Framework for Studying the Governance Implications for Financial Innovation
'Disruptive innovation' 62 refers to the creation of new markets and value networks that eventually disrupt existing markets and value networks, displacing established market leaders and alliances. This framework may be more specifically understood as the development of innovation that first takes place at the low end of the market, which does not immediately threaten incumbents as it is a weak substitute. The innovation however distinguishes itself by new performance criteria to the market, such as convenience and portability, lower price, or ease of use. The gradual uptake by the market and development of economies of scale stealthily allow the innovation to become dominant in due course, disrupting and replacing incumbents. 65 In this manner, the key characteristics of 'disruption' connote of genuine 'change' with substitutive potential that ultimately produces structural impact.
'Change' is defined as achieving a difference in performance and value (especially to customers) whether it is achieved by a product, process, functional, service or utility change. 66 Sometimes change is symptomatic i.e. in methodologies and processes. Other changes may be more substantive, such as customer preferences or shifting the bases of competition. A genuinely disruptive change would be one, whether symptomatic or substantive, which would result in significant market or structural impact upon the industry. 67 Substitutive potential can arise whether or not the disruption comes from the same sector, or outside of the given sector, as long as the function of substitution may be achieved. 68 Such substitution could be in relation to financial products, intermediation processes or interfaces, or financial markets.
'Structural impact' refers to how the change and substituting innovation eventually creates significant repercussions at industry level and causes structural change to the industry itself. 69 Such impact should be pervasive 70 in order to be significant and not merely a flash in the pan. Studying impact can however can take time as 'change' and 'substitution' can undergo a process of institutionalisation which may not be easily foreseen.
We argue that the 'disruptive innovation' framework gives rise to these three elements 'change', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact' that can inform regulatory thinking. A framework for regulatory thinking is useful to prevent forward-looking or 'judgment-based' regulation 71 Substitutive changes that have a structural impact will inevitably undermine regulatory assumptions underlying these frameworks. Regulators need to be able to adapt to new structures in firms/organisations, marketplaces and intermediation practices and methodologies in order to review constantly if public interest objectives such as investor protection, financial stability and market confidence are being achieved.
The post-crisis financial regulatory environment has become an expanded universe in terms of regulatory objectives. 75 This is in response to the recognition that severe governance gaps have arisen in an era of deregulation and minimalist regulation focused on narrowly defined marketbased goals such as market efficiency. 76 gaps. 83 Regulators also act in a governance landscape that is multi-faceted and de-centred 84 and informal governance mechanisms such as industry bodies' guidance, shareholder activism and other mechanisms also need to be considered in the governance matrix.
'Disruptive innovation' is an appropriate framework for this article as the focus is on fintech, which is currently driven by fringe movements in the financial sector or outside of the sector altogether, 85 less so by incumbent companies' incremental innovation, in keeping with the character of Bower's and Christensen's original thesis. Further, we are also of the view that given the rapidly developing nature of financial innovation observed over the past decades, 'disruptive' forms of financial innovation are but the norm. Hence, we are of the view that the 'disruptive innovation' framework is arguably the only appropriate high-level framework that captures the nature and character of financial innovation in order to flesh out its key aspects.
It may be argued that the 'disruptive innovation' framework is too narrow as it does not encompass incremental forms of innovation that could achieve the same effects in terms of change, substitution and impact. We do not think that the use of the 'disruptive innovation' framework is inappropriate as it is used in a broader sense focused on the outcome effects of 'change', 'substitution' and 'structural impact', and thus encompasses innovation trajectories that are more evolutionary in nature. 86 This article does not foreclose the possibility that 'disruptive innovation' may arise from within an industry incumbent that changes and substitutes its existing products or services in such a way that structural impact is achieved.
This article will proceed to discuss fintech innovation in financial products, services and markets by applying the 'disruptive innovation' framework to discuss the aspects of 'change', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact'. The nature of the 'change', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact' of selected fintech developments is necessarily appraised against the fabric of existing developments and our application of the disruptive innovation framework is a highly contextualised approach. Financial product innovation is driven by financialisation-the increasing reliance upon finance to meet economic needs. 87 In a political scientist's view, 'financialisation is the increase in the influence of financial markets, institutions and elites over both the economy and other institutions of society, including the government.' 88 Financialisation corresponds with the retreat of the state in welfarism, leaving savers to manage their myriad savings needs including long-term retirement needs via investment.
B. Financial Product Innovation
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Saving is defined as deferred consumption, 90 expected to be deployed for use after accumulation, such as for a deposit payment for a house purchase; or for the purposes of capital formation for new productive activity, i.e. investment. 91 In an era of financialisation, the function of saving is increasingly mediated by investment, 92 such that investment has become the key generator of income for deferred consumption. In other words, saving is almost exclusively carried out through investment. Erturk et al 93 describe financialisation as championing a form of democratic participation for households in the investment market, giving opportunities to and empowering households to be engaged in wealth generation through saving in investment.
A key trend in financial product innovation is the broadening of investment choice. Encouraging savers to access financial markets is a confluence of public policy as well as the private interests of the financial sector. The financial sector has grown in importance, scale and profit levels with savers being channelled into its conduits to meet various economic needs. Two key trends in financial innovation which respond to such demand-led forces are the collectivisation of savings for investment, with phenomenal implications for financial product innovation, and the mass-selling of risk management products such as insurance packaged with credit or banking products.
Collectivisation of Investment Management
In order to meet the needs of cost-effective access to professional investment management, savings are organised into collective investment vehicles. Collective pooling of savings into investment funds ensures sufficiently affordable access to investment due to economies of scale. However, this gives rise to standardisation in the relational dimension between investment intermediaries and savers, and therefore (ironically) less prospect for tailor-made financial solutions to specific needs. capitalism where the masses become feedstock for finance. The collectivisation of savers' capital into pools intermediated by financial intermediaries results in certain ramifications for the characterisation of the investment paradigm-investment is channelled into a collective product branded by the intermediary's management competence and expertise. Savers thus invest in abstract 'products' and not identified 'borrowers'. Savers seek accountability for their trust by looking at narrowly defined but comparable performance metrics applied to investment funds, and manage their risks by looking to the right to exit either in a secondary market or through redemption rights. Hence, the financial innovation of collective investment has steadily resulted in the transactionalisation of investment relationships and the de-socialisation of the investment products market in general.
95
Investment intermediaries compete for market share and engage in marketing and branding to attract financial flows to themselves, Bogle 96 observes that investment intermediaries have become focused upon capturing as much as possible of the supply of capital instead of managing such capital as stewards for the beneficiaries who have entrusted them. Increasingly, investment intermediaries and savers are focused on myopic perspectives in short-termist investment performance.
The changing character of the investment market to be de-personalised, transactional and myopic/short termist is not something that regulators grasped immediately. Much of investment regulation in the UK continued to assume a relational paradigm in investment intermediation, relying on common law rules of duties of care and fiduciary duties to meet investors' needs. investment management practices. 101 The EU has already tabled a proposal to govern one aspect of investment funds' practices-the exercise of funds' corporate governance rights in investee companies.
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The substitution of private investment management for state welfarism has resulted in irreversible structural impact in the age of financialisation, which includes the growth of the industry of investment management and collectively managed products. The private organisation of collective investment is the prevailing paradigm for savers to meet their long-term investment needs. Law and regulation have been slow to catch onto the nature of the seismic change.
Mass-selling of Consumer-based Risk Management in Packaged Products
Another development in financial product innovation is that of bundled elements in financial products, such as credit, insurance and deposit all in one. Such products appeal to consumers as they seem to be a holistic means of meeting financial needs while balanced by appropriate risk management.
The market for bundled products allows financial innovation to be commoditised 103 on a large scale while at the same time creating cost-effective opportunities for access. 104 However, marketization also results in certain perverse incentives towards mis-selling to financial consumers products they may not need. 105 In this way, the financial intermediation relationships have been distorted by perverse incentives to become predatory and transient relationships, increasingly alienated from a sense of professional service. 106 As many financial goods are credence goods, i.e. their performance or utility takes time to become apparent, it is not difficult for financial intermediaries to abuse the agency problem 107 by making immediate sales of products for immediate gain, leaving the end-user to reckon with the utility of the product (or lack thereof) in the longer term.
Bundled products are mass-sold (and mis-sold) to consumers on a phenomenal scale in the UK, and it has taken many years for the mis-selling of payment protection insurance and card identity 101 protection insurance products to unravel. Although they can serve genuinely useful purposes, 108 such products have been sold in an undiscriminating manner for the purposes of profit-making. 109 It has taken years for the regulator to introduce redress mechanisms 110 and to take enforcement actions against such mis-selling. 111 The slowness and reactive nature of regulatory response is again an under-appreciation of the seismic change in financialisation and consumer responsibilisation, as increasing commoditisation of financial products and consumers have brought about a structurally predatory sales culture 112 in the financial sector.
The two trends discussed above have been made possible in a regulatory context where regulators tend not to regulate financial products directly. 113 This means that financial regulation has seldom prescribed the features of investment products, leaving the design of such products to market forces and leaving it to the market to judge their quality. The entrenched reticence with respect to product quality is understandable, as distortions of perception, which can be introduced by 'regulatory endorsement' should be prevented in relation to credence goods. 114 However, such reticence means that financial intermediaries have a substantial amount of freedom to structure their products in accordance with their incentives and efficiency structures. The true social utility of products is likely affected by the principal-agent problem but the extent of this cannot be determined on an ex ante basis. Mis-selling is not easy to prevent in such a context. In other words, 'tainted intermediation' is a structural problem for investors navigating the choice of financial products.
We are of the view that the structural problem of 'tainted intermediation' is in part due to the lack of regulatory engagement in the pre-crisis era with developments in product innovation. Applying the 'disruptive innovation' framework, regulators should have observed that there are (a) changes in financial consumption trends, (b) changes in intermediary behaviour and culture, (c) observed patterns of 'substitution' i.e. from relationship-based to market-based financial intermediation and (d) the emergence of 'structural impact' upon the industry in terms of investment collectivisation and mass-selling. These indicia could have provided possibilities to reflect upon public interest needs and the role of regulation and governance. The commoditisation of savers and borrowers and the de-personalisation of the investment paradigm have caused lasting structural impact on the investment management industry, now characterised as short-termist 115 and riddled with principalagent problems, 116 affecting the ultimate performance and utility of products sold.
Regulators in the UK and EU have begun to take steps to address the structural problem of 'tainted intermediation' by regulating conduct of business more stringently. The EU for example has introduced more prescriptive rules of investment management in its largest mutual fund industry, the UCITs, 117 and in conduct of business in advice and distribution generally. 118 The UK has in addition to adopting those rules also imposed its own regime of retail distribution, 119 banning product commissions and forcing investment advisers to be directly remunerated by their clients so as to minimise conflicts of interest at the advisory stage. However, there is still relatively little regulatory thinking on the nature and purposes of the financial products themselves, although 'product intervention' powers, as mentioned earlier, have been introduced to prevent potential misselling.
Against this context, fintech is leading a new wave of financial product innovation towards reconstructing the relational basis in the investment paradigm, re-connecting savers and borrowers directly. Will this provide a much-needed balance to the deficiencies of the current landscape for retail financial products? We sketch the major key features of these new products and highlight issues for consideration in terms of the regulation and governance. New financial products that cater to investors fashion themselves as unconnected to the conventional banking industry that has fallen into disrepute since the global financial crisis 2007-9. They are also marketed as being able to provide alternative returns opportunities in a relatively low interest rate environment. 120 Two key innovations, online crowdfunding and peer-to-peer financial services have arisen to be popular retail investment options of late, and create appeal by distinguishing themselves as being exclusively online interfaces, using digital information technology to change how financial products are offered. These new products also seem to differentiate themselves from the collectivisation and mass-selling culture discussed above. These products encourage direct consumer interfaces and evaluation, and seem to tease the consumer into a sense of empowerment and engaged selection. However, we suggest that these products are in early days of development. The sense of refreshing 'alternativeness' offered by these products inherently contains a trade-off for the consumer-a higher degree of responsibilisation and diligence is required. Moreover, these products do not yet benefit from the standardised regulatory protections attached to established products in advice and distribution. Further, the 'alternativeness' of these products may be over-sold. These products are often structured as collective products in which consumers participate, and so the submergence of individual consumers into a 'pool' is the same investment structure as that which persists in the mainstream. The increasingly popularity of such products could also lead to more standardisation and 'mass-selling'.
Fintech and Financial Product Innovation
Online crowdfunding allows individuals to participate in funding a project, by pooling small contributions together. The project could be a civic movement, a cultural project, a community development or a small business. Crowdfunders do not share ownership of the project but instead enjoy gifts or tokens of appreciation from the project owners and managers. 121 This means of fundraising has become popular with small businesses and with investors-small businesses are able to raise important though small sums for starting up and developing, while not being subject to expensive compliance requirements under securities regulation, 122 and investors enjoy the appeal of selecting the recipient of their funding as a matter of personal choice. In fact, commentators point out that such investment choices are socially embedded, involving elements of consideration for social or public worthiness, 123 relational dimensions such as being family or friends of the finance-seeker, 124 and other factors that are not economically rational, such as being supportive of the local community 125 or heeding an online herding trend.
126
Online peer-to-peer (P2P) financial services, of which the most significant is P2P lending in consumer credit, 127 allows individuals to post information on an online platform in order to attract lenders.
Typically lenders may finalise a price for the loan ie interest rate and duration, through an open auction process or through posting, 128 and would only take fractions of the total amount sought.
Hence, the online platform brokers a syndicated loan for the loan-seeker, charging a fee for such brokering service, as well as servicing of the payments made. The loans may range from 12-60 months in duration, and the lenders bear the risk of default.
Online crowdfunding and P2P financial services are a growing sector, and major players such as the Lending Club Corporation and On Deck Capital in the US have already listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Regulators, anxious that financial innovation should not be unduly stifled, have been tentative on governing these areas. In the US, the JOBS Act creates exemptions for online crowdfunding if certain investor protection thresholds are met, and eases some requirements for P2P platforms imposed by the Securities Exchange Commission in terms of filing prospectuses. 129 In the UK, P2P lenders are subject to a modified version of capital adequacy and disclosure requirements that are proportionate for their business, 130 while online crowdfunding platforms need to ensure that certain investor protections are achieved, such as marketing largely to sophisticated investors and limiting the exposure of retail investors' net assets to such opportunities.
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Regulators are taking restrained approaches to govern the new fintech products in a highly derivative manner from existing regulatory regimes. This approach may be based on a presumption that the issues that may arise from such financial innovation are the same, or that the regulatory objectives are equivalent. Hence, the UK FCA's reliance on capital adequacy requirements to govern P2P lenders, mimicking banking regulation, and the reliance placed by both the US SEC and UK FCA on disclosure and exempt offerings under securities regulation to deal with online crowdfunding.
132
The broad critique against such approaches is that they are derivative in nature and such an approach is questionable in terms of its wisdom to deal with new issues. That said, such regulatory regimes are by no means finalised and the article does not engage in a protracted critique of regulatory regimes that are only emerging. Instead, we propose using the 'disruptive innovation' framework above to flesh out the key 'changes', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact' that are relevant for regulatory monitoring.
A 'Disruptive Innovation' Model in Understanding the Implications of Fintech Product Innovation
As discussed above, 'tainted intermediation' is a structural problem for investors navigating the choice of financial products. Financial products based on fintech innovation may offer a refreshing option. Using a disruptive innovation framework, we discuss below how online crowdfunding and P2P lending introduces 'change', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact' for regulatory consideration.
In terms of 'change', online crowdfunding and P2P lending models offer direct access to retail investors for many small amounts of contribution, hence commentators describe this feature as a form of 'disintermediation'. 133 The benefit of disintermediation is the reconstruction of the relationship between borrower and saver directly. Besides such disintermediation seems available at a cost that is affordable, 134 through platform-based technologies that are able to match the supply and demand sides of capital, and even offer comparative information, choice and access. 135 Does such 'disintermediation' offer a powerful alternative to the existing structures of intermediation?
We are sceptical of the empowering claims of disintermediation for ultimate borrowers and savers/lenders. 136 This is because these products significantly change the patterns in risk allocation.
Using online crowdfunding and P2P portals, investors vet their investees/borrowers directly using information posted and determine whether or not to extend their contribution, hence bearing in full the credit, as well as market risks associated with their investment. This is a change from the full intermediation model offered by depositary banks and partial intermediation models offered by investment firms which are subject to a range of disclosure, conduct of business rules and portfolio composition rules. 137 Regulators need to be mindful of the public interest implications from such a change in risk allocation, and consider whether investors' expectations are commensurate with the risk levels they are assuming. to take enforcement action against their borrowers or lending platforms? Regulators should be mindful that these products are ultimately collective investment products where individual investments are aggregated and investors may not have an individual 'claim' against the borrower. Without going into length in this paper and notwithstanding this to be an important question, private law actions are highly arguable as the collective nature of the investment and the lack of a form of securities regulation makes any individual claim more difficult to sustain against the borrower. Further the limited nature of the platform's intermediation role also makes it difficult to sustain conduct of business claims against them. At a basic level, investors must appreciate that there is a concomitant shift in risk allocation towards them with potentially lower levels of investor protection.
Nevertheless, the social embedment of online crowdfunding and P2P lending may infuse investment decisions with considerations beyond efficiency and economic viability. These factors may make such financial markets more diverse and less prone to systemic herding forces that pervade many conventional financial markets. However, how the social underpinnings of such investments would work out in balancing the financial eco-system is uncertain, and what other unintended consequences may entail need to be studied.
Moreover, online crowdfunding and P2P pending platforms are changing the way a lending or investment decision is made. Empirical research has produced mixed results as to how robustly lenders and investors accurately process information posted about the borrower/investee prospects.
Research has indicated that information technology breakthroughs have allowed lenders/investors to better assess the credit risk of borrowers/investees, 138 but at the same time, research has also found that lenders/investors rely on impressionistic short-hand information such as prospects' appearance to make decisions. 139 Such de-standardisation and subjectivisation is not based on robust assumptions of retail lenders' and investors' assessment of information and decision-making. There are potential investor protection and market stability issues that may require regulatory monitoring in such a de-standardised and subjective market interface.
In terms of 'substitutive potential', it may be argued that online crowdfunding and P2P lending are unlikely to be able to coordinate very large amounts. Hence traditional banks and investment banks continue to play an important part in large scale finance such as in corporate and project finance. The substitutive potential is greatest for smaller amounts, i.e. small business and individual consumer credit. 140 However, regulators need to monitor these areas even if the amounts involved are not phenomenal. This is because areas of consumer credit and small business finance command social attention and public interest concern -scandals that arise in these quarters often trigger significant social response.
Finally, in terms of structural impact, we see the online crowdfunding and P2P lending models as ushering in two key structural trends. One is the use of information analytics to automate much of financial communications and intermediation, and the other is the consolidation of innovative and conventional forms of financial intermediation in bringing about new transformations.
Online crowdfunding and P2P lending platforms provide a significant amount of information to lenders/investors, whether posted by the prospects themselves or linked to social networking sites, where the prospects may be vetted as individuals, and not just according to standardised financial information. 141 Information technology breakthroughs may be able to achieve efficiency in data analytics, the use of big data, and transform how investment market interfaces work. The 'levelling' of information asymmetry made possible by such data analytics revolutions could go towards mitigating one of the entrenched features of the principal-agent problem in 'tainted intermediation'. Investors could be given more and relevant information, and be in a position to demand more transparency too.
Conventional banking and investment firms are starting to adopt such new interfaces and methodology used by online crowdfunding and P2P lending platforms, having a transformative effect upon financial sector intermediation more widely. Further, the consolidation of fringe or alternative fintech businesses into mainstream financial groups could also result in structural transformation in the industry. We already see Lending Club tying up with Union Bank in order to achieve a public flotation, and banks taking stakes in P2P lenders in order to use the P2P front to grow their market shares.
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We are of the view that fintech products have the potential to countervail some aspects of suboptimal principal-agent problems in conventional financial intermediation. However, their novelty and disintermediated interfaces bring investor protection issues more sharply into focus, making regulators more anxious about their governance implications. Regulators need to study the key change in risk allocation and compare with the relative merits and deficiencies of mainstream intermediation where structural principal-agent problems are rife. Regulators should also monitor the footprint of the new fintech-based products to determine in what areas of credit they have a substitutive effect and whether such substitutive potential could become structurally significant. In that light, regulators can then determine the scope of the necessary regulatory perimeter for these new fintech-based products and the design of regulatory governance in order to achieve an appropriate degree of investor protection and financial stability.
We do not present presumptively a blueprint for how online crowdfunding or P2P lending ought to be governed, only fleshing out relevant issues using the 'disruptive innovation' framework to develop regulatory thinking. We believe that this approach is better able to inform reasoned policymaking that does not merely address the symptomatic or is derivative in nature.
C. Financial Intermediation Interfaces and Processes
Financial intermediation processes are subject to constant evolution and innovation, in response to market and regulatory changes. New intermediary entities, new processes and methodologies in asset, risk and liquidity transformations, and new interfaces of engagement with investors characterise the nature of innovation in financial intermediation. These changes have been driven by the needs of operational cost-effectiveness and efficiency, consumer demand for certain attributes of their experience, such as speed, simplicity and easy access, the forces of competition and breakthroughs in financial, legal and digital technology. Investors have moved from relying on a bank branch manager's investment advice 143 to using external systems of rating such as credit ratings for corporate debt and securities. 144 Short-term borrowing by banks has moved from inter-bank lending arrangements to highly developed wholesale money markets where short-term borrowing is financed by collateral and can be obtained from money market funds, asset managers other wholesale sector institutions. 145 Financial innovation has also developed many changes to user interfaces, from the bank teller to the automated teller machine and internet banking. Investors are shifting from face-to-face investment advice sessions to automated advice portals or robo-advisers and online execution-only products.
The new wave of financial innovation led by fintech continues along some common themes that have persisted through the years of financial intermediation evolution. Two key themes are disintermediation (and re-intermediation) and automation.
Disintermediation?
Disintermediation often refers to innovations that allow the by-passing of existing middlemen so that the entities at the end of the supply and demand chain (i.e. savers/investors and borrowers/fund raisers) could meet directly. 146 In finance, 'middlemen' or intermediaries may perform a variety of roles. French and Leyschon describe these as 'Type I', 'Type 2' and 'Type 3' roles. 147 Type 1 roles refer largely to intermediation in terms of information and transaction costs.
For example, the use of a broker to execute purchases and sales of securities is a Type 1 intermediation. The broker engages in information intermediation for the investor, informing the investor of buy and sell research, and carries out the execution of the investor's trade. Type 1 intermediation is essentially of a brokerage nature.
Type 2 intermediation involves a form of asset transformation, usually in respect of liquidity. For example, the full intermediation performed by banks that take customer deposits on an on-demand basis 148 in order to transform deposits into long-term loans. More recent types of transformations include securitisation, which is the transformation of illiquid and relationship-based assets like mortgage loans into more standardised and marketable securities that can be sold more widely to investors. Collective investment is also a Type 2 intermediation. Another line of literature is more business-oriented and looks into whether the supply and demand sides for investment capital are actually able to transact directly without the assistance of Types 1, 2 or 3 intermediaries. 154 For example, one could argue that the development of online platforms allows insurance purchasers to buy directly from insurance companies and hence the role of the insurance broker is subject to disintermediation. This is a form of Type 1 disintermediation, where the internet revolution facilitates more effective access to information, thus giving insurance purchasers the tools to bypass the insurance broker. Nevertheless, we observe that new providers arise to offer services to compare features and premiums for insurance products, hence consumers may prefer to use an online comparison site 155 in order to decide which insurance products to buy.
In this sense, the apparent disintermediation we observed is only temporary, giving rise to new reintermediation by new or existing providers. Even if the internet has revolutionised information access, information gathering and analysis is still a time-consuming exercise, and the room for reintermediation has quickly been filled up by fintech innovation in the form of comparison and rating sites.
One may also see the advent of the blockchain technology as being able to introduce real disintermediation in financial investment transactions. This is because blockchain, which is a distributed ledger technology, allows the supply and demand sides of capital to meet online and to execute transactions as a private arrangement verified and sealed by secure cryptographic technology maintained by volunteer software engineers. 156 The use of blockchain technology to execute and confirm transactions ensures that the veracity of such transactions are not dependent on the settlement, clearing and centralised custodial systems underlying securities markets, hence we can bypass the existing financial intermediation infrastructure. 157 Although the distributed ledger technology has genuine disintermediating effects, it does not offer information intermediation or asset, maturity and liquidity transformation. Hence, an investor that seeks those services are unlikely to be able to avoid using financial intermediaries altogether. Disintermediation is not only about the technological capabilities offered for the purpose, it correspondingly requires increased due diligence, oversight and increased endeavour and responsibility on the part of investors. These trade-offs do not make it certain that investors would opt for disintermediating options and relegate financial intermediaries to obsolescence.
Where Types 1 and 3 disintermediation are concerned, commentators are sceptical that there has been real disintermediation of a lasting impact. Even if certain intermediation processes and interfaces can be disrupted by cheaper and more accessible alternatives, the cost of information mediation and transaction formation are not eliminated. Disintermediation only gives rise to re- intermediation, 158 and as Lin observes, finance is a persistent state of 'infinite intermediation'. 159 Gialdini and Lenglet describe the persistence of financial intermediation as being due to the need for translators of processes to bring together the supply and demand sides for investment capital, and this hermeneutic function is a form of sense-making in order to help each side achieve their ends. 160 For example, payment users who switch from credit cards to google pay are not supporting disintermediation as such, but re-intermediation. The recognition of the reality of disintermediation as being a largely transitional process to re-intermediation would help regulators in conceptualising the scope of regulatory regimes and to consider conduct risks in new re-intermediary relationships. For example, the UK FCA is monitoring how new information intermediaries like price comparison websites influence consumer behaviour and are looking into ensuring that their conduct is fair and aboveboard. 161 Price comparison websites can be incentivised to influence consumer behaviour under conflicts of interest, for example by placing certain search results high in the list where these are from providers that pay them commissions. The FCA has brought price comparison websites within its regulatory perimeter. 162 It has further conducted a thematic review in 2014 revealing failings in price comparison websites' conduct, such as making recommendations about best products to buy without explaining clearly the basis for doing so. 163 In terms of Type 2 disintermediation, Lin is of the view that asset transformation functions are highly sophisticated and difficult to disintermediate fully. 164 This is because the benefits of such disintermediation are less clear cut. Although investors may pay less fees for relatively disintermediated investment options such as P2P lending, investors do not enjoy the risk management and asset transformation offered by Type 2 intermediaries such as mutual and hedge funds. 165 The lower cost of access to more highly disintermediated opportunities such as P2P lending has to be juxtaposed against the greater information diligence that has to be undertaken by the investor in light of the investor's full assumption of credit risk. Indeed, commentators 166 see that reintermediation trends in this industry are already arising. Credit scoring intermediaries and other information mediation agents have arisen to bridge the information and diligence gaps for investors. Investors in this industry would still incur a set of new transaction costs.
Automation
A persistent trend that shapes financial intermediation methodologies and interfaces is the use of automation to improve efficiencies for both savers/investors and borrowers/fund-raisers. Earlier uses of automation have been focused on information and data organisation, such as organising borrower information to help the exercise of human judgment in making underwriting decisions.
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Such automation is able to take the 'manual chores' out of the financial intermediation processes and achieve operational efficiency, complementing the exercise of human judgement. The efficiency savings would likely also be experienced by borrowers as there is less delay in waiting for approvals for mortgages or other credit, 168 and borrowers would be assured a process where information about them has been comprehensively collected, and consistently organised and used.
However automation innovation is also driven by human curiosity that wishes to see how far artificial intelligence can be developed. 169 Increasingly, artificial intelligence is used to substitute for the judgment functions that humans carry out in the financial intermediation processes. Two key trends are robo-advice and algorithmic trading. We turn to robo-advice and will return to algorithmic trading to be discussed in the next Part.
Robo-advisors have arisen in the financial services marketplace as a cost-effective means for small investors to obtain investment advice that is tailor-made. They are essentially automated interfaces that offer investment advice and discretionary investment management services without the intervention of a human adviser, using algorithms and asset allocation models that are advertised as being tailored to each individual's investment needs.
Robo-advisers take the information automation developments in the industry to a new level. They could be fed with significant amounts of information on investment products, risk classifications and forward-looking information, and they could be made to perform the mapping task between such information and investor information that is provided to them. The robustness of the mapping exercise would largely depend on whether the robo-adviser is programmed in such a way as to be able to categorise investor information well and make the right interpretations out of them.
Commentators have mixed views on whether robo-advisers can robustly map and interpret investor information accurately and then 'recommend' a range of suitable products to investors. Supporting commentators are of the view that the robo-adviser is a genuine low-cost investment adviser for small investors, and serves the purpose of financial inclusion and access. 170 Robo-advice can in principle be promoted even if the robo-advising capabilities need to be refined. Further, the roboadviser is seen to be more capable of consistent interpretation and application of information.
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However, Fein voices scepticism of robo-advisers as they are seen to be unable to substitute for certain capabilities of human judgment, and hence cannot discharge the fiduciary standard of care or the suitability standard for investment advice that are currently imposed under legislation for US investment advisers and broker-dealers. 172 In particular, she voices doubts as to robo-advisers' capability to have a holistic view of investors' portfolio needs. Such holistic or 'peripheral vision' in exercising judgment about an investor's portfolio is a human capability that artificial intelligence is likely unable to replicate. Further, robo-advisers tend to standardise the information they have been provided and are not able to detect nuances in investors' communications and sentiment. These limitations make robo-advisers unable to fully comprehend an investors' appetite and needs She also thinks that robo-advisers suffer from the same agency problems as human advisers, in terms of conflicts of interest management, and may in fact be less effective in drawing investors' attention to such matters. 173 We are unlikely to see a rollback on the innovative developments in automation and artificial intelligence. 174 The profound implications of such change lie primarily in the substitution of human labour, and increasingly human judgment, and regulators need to consider if such a development is adequately captured within existing conduct of business rules and whether private law bargaining and remedies can address investor protection needs. The UK FCA envisions that automated advice can be provided without the need for human intervention in the regime of 'simplified advice', 175 for the benefit of retail customers. Nevertheless it is for the providers of such automated portals to demonstrate that they meet the same standards of suitability as imposed on investment advisers generally. Regulators should consider how evolutions in automation affect the scope of regulated entities, the setting of regulatory standards and the attachment of responsibilities and liability.
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A 'Disruptive Innovation' Model in Understanding the Implications of Fintech in Intermediation Processes and Interfaces
Fintech is will constantly push the boundaries in disintermediation, re-intermediation and automation, likely focusing on customer user interfaces and the consumer experience. 177 Applying the 'disruptive innovation' framework to such developments, we highlight the 'changes' with 'substitutive potential' that are likely to have 'structural impact' in order to frame the relevant perspectives for regulatory thinking.
Regulators need to pay attention to the changes in terms of new intermediaries that arise as a result of new technologies in intermediation processes and interfaces, and consider if those new industries give rise to gaps in investor and consumer protection as well as regulatory arbitrage. It need not be assumed that the wholesale extension of regulatory perimeter is always warranted, and indeed the adaptation of regulatory design is almost always warranted.
For example, we are of the view that the FCA's approach to price comparison websites should be refined in light of their comparative properties. Such websites are useful to consumers for comparative purposes, and so perhaps conduct of business standards should focus on this particular aspect, ensuring that the 'comparative expectations' are met. We would like to see specific conduct of business rules for example dealing with website capabilities in surveying the whole of the market, and explicitly revealing any limitations, and setting out clearly the parameters of comparison and how the results should be used. These are different standards from those generally applicable to individual advice and thus, conventional conduct of business rules under the UK and EU legislation 178 may be over and under-inclusive at the same time.
New intermediaries such as information intermediaries for online P2P and crowdfunding portals should be monitored, as well as new payment intermediaries such as Apply iPay, Google pay and Amazon payments, in order to discern changes in performance and conduct of business aspects that affect regulatory objectives. In terms of credit information intermediaries, regulators need to consider the market and systemic importance of the accuracy of their representations. It may be considered as to whether regulatory principles should be introduced for intermediaries' internal quality systems for the formation of opinions as well as their communication formats. 179 In terms of payment intermediaries, the regulatory objectives of payment integrity, settlement certainty and systemic orderliness should guide regulators in considering how such new payment intermediaries should be governed as compared to existing bank-based payment systems and credit card providers. 180 Further, existing intermediaries who foray into new areas should also be monitored in terms of the implications for the existing regulatory parameters. For example, asset managers are increasingly becoming important in asset and liquidity transformation, rivalling banks in the importance of these functions, and it is important to monitor their prudential conduct in such transformations and impact on systemic risk. 181 In terms of substitutive potential, it is important for regulators to pay special attention to how far functions of human judgment may be substituted by fintech innovations that continue to accelerate automation in financial services. There may be scope for considering whether some functions should not be fully or partly substituted by human judgment and how complementarity with human judgment should be preserved. On the other hand, it is also pertinent to consider to what extent the substitution for human discretion may indeed improve the principal-agent problems in the clientintermediary relationship.
Further, it may be important to qualify the use of automation in risk management and the making of prudential judgments, as bank internal models for capital adequacy have been shown to be inadequate before the global financial crisis 2007-9, grossly under-estimating risk. Models can be manipulated to be overly optimistic in order to avoid regulatory obligations, 182 and it is important to discern what perverse incentives there are in using automation. Scopino also points out that one of the implications of the substitution of human judgment is the reframing of responsibility and liability for financial services providers. Robots cannot be directly impugned for the outputs they deliver, hence liability and responsibility need to be framed appropriately for the designers and users of such interfaces and processes. This is an area fraught with debate as we need to consider whether the effects upon the market are important enough for us to define liabilities into strict forms, such as adopted in the EU and UK in relation to market manipulation, 183 or whether states of mind and standards of care are relevant and to what extent.
Finally in terms of structural impact, the automation and online provision of many financial intermediation processes and interfaces will continue to bring major changes in the financial sector. The relocation of financial intermediation processes into the virtual sphere raises implications in terms of globalisation and the reach of territorial regulation, cyber-risks, confidentiality, and shifts in the relational dimensions of the intermediary-client relationship. There is a need for regulators to coordinate with each other at the international level in terms of standard-setting as well as global surveillance, information sharing and enforcement assistance. 184 There is scope to consider the necessity for extra-territorial legislation. 185 It is important for regulators to work with technology experts and a network of surveillance and enforcement agencies in addressing how cyber-risks may affect traditional conceptions of investor protection and intermediary responsibility. 186 Finally, regulators must also be aware that fintech developments that may appear 'alternative' today could rapidly become widely adopted and regulators should not be taken by surprise. The judgment-based approach 187 championed internationally and in the UK can form the basis for a regulatory approach that adopts early monitoring and reflective consideration of the key aspects of fintech innovation in terms of 'change', 'substitutive potential' and 'structural impact' in considering regulatory implications.
We also think that fintech in intermediary interfaces and processes provides inspiration for possible regulatory innovation that will being about significant structural impact. For example, fintech advancement could be applied to financial consumer dispute resolution. This is an important complement to the structural changes in financial intermediation processes and interfaces. As consumers are increasingly promised cost-effective, quick, immediate access to financial intermediation services that could be partly or fully automated, why should not consumer disputes be capable of resolution within similar principles, frameworks and interfaces? In the UK, there is scope to consider developing the Financial Ombudsman service 188 in this way.
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D. Market-places in Finance
185 such as under the European Union Market Abuse Directive that potentially targets any market abuse activity in relation to financial instruments that are traded on European financial markets which can be concurrently traded elsewhere, Article 2(4) of the Market Abuse Regulation 2014 states that the prohibition of market abuse behaviour and hence the enforcement against such behaviour is in relation to financial instruments traded on regulated and authorised trading exchanges or platforms, so trading conduct that occurs in a third country affecting such instruments would be caught within the scope of the Regulation. 186 For eg see Morgan Stanley, Beyond Firewalls: A New World of Cyber Security (Nov 2015) . It is to be noted that the US SEC has started to adopt Regulations that deal with cyber risks, in particular to ensure that regulated institutions and markets have control structures in place to address information security and deal with cyber risks, such as Regulation SCI, Regulation S-P at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/cybersecurity.shtml. This area is still generally submerged in 'organisational arrangements' in the EU, with no specific flagging up of cyber risks see for eg Art 16, Markets in Financial Instruments Directive that deals generally with the continuity and efficiency of operations, sound governance structures, general internal control and safeguard of information. In sum there are regulatory duties imposed on firms to ensure adequate infrastructure, systems and safeguards but the extent of firms legal liabilities are yet untested. 187 Finally we turn to how market-places in finance have been constituted and are evolving in order to discern the aspects of 'change', 'substitution' and 'structural impact' that may inform regulatory considerations.
Market-places in financial instruments used to tend towards centralisation. This is because the network effects of users favour consolidating transactions in a dominant marketplace where transactions can be more efficiently executed. The rise of national stock exchanges for corporate securities reflected this particular tendency. 190 However, the rise of market monopolies or oligopolies has produced uncompetitive effects, 191 and this has led to a deliberate policy movement in the US, UK and EU to foster market competition, ie to stimulate a market for markets. 192 The development of market competition in the UK was led by harmonised EU legislation. Policy intervention in this area may be regarded as addressing a market failure, but may also be regarded as distorting. Nevertheless, such policy intervention has produced a largely fragmented state of financial market structures. Inter-market competition and fragmentation has become a structural reality in financial marketplaces. Against this context, we will discuss recent developments such as dark pools, trading innovations and even alternative 'utopian' marketplaces denominated in unconventional value carriers (such as private currencies like bitcoin).
The Fragmented Markets Phenomenon
In the US, UK and EU an array of marketplaces cater for broker-dealers' trading activities, from national exchanges in New York, London and Frankfurt to electronic networks set up by brokerages and investment banks, such as BATS which consolidated with Chi-X, Instinet (bought by Nomura) and Archipelago which was consolidated with the NYSE. We could also consider investment banks' order books as internal marketplaces; internalisation being frequently practiced in the EU. Into the picture we should add newer developments such as 'dark pools' 193 which are closed networks that do not display price transparency and are intended for the execution of usually large orders where traders prefer anonymity.
Market fragmentation is the result of policy support for market competition. Such policy support is arguably not unwarranted as commentators have found that indicators of market quality have improved with competition between fragmented markets. A survey of literature indicates broadly that price discovery has improved, i.e. bid-ask spreads on markets have reduced 194 and transaction fees have been reduced. 195 Further, market fragmentation caters to the needs of different traders, 196 and the rise of dark pools is a case in point. Dark pools have arisen primarily as venues where institutional investors could anonymously trade large orders of securities without unduly exposing themselves or affecting price movements in the open market. 197 However, they are controversial as they do not practice price transparency 198 and therefore cause adverse selection. They can be seen to be a place that steals the liquidity that institutional orders would have offered to open marketplaces. 199 In such dark pools, the less transparent environment may also be used by brokers towards abusive ends, such as the carrying out of proprietary trading that is detrimental to the interests of their clients. 200 It is inconclusive if liquidity across fragmented markets, including secretive dark pools, is reduced overall.
In critically evaluating the pros and cons of market fragmentation, one needs to bear in mind the effects of regulatory intervention. Where markets are in competition as such (without any regulatory policy that addresses the adverse effects of such competition), the increase in information cost for brokers and investors and the reduced pools of liquidity in each fragmented venue could result in adverse selection cost, worse price efficiency, liquidity and transaction outcomes for individual trades. 202 It could be argued that fragmented markets only work and demonstrate beneficial effects as a result of regulatory intervention in the US, UK and EU that foster a level playing field. 203 In other words, policy-makers' fostering of market competition results in a form of 'controlled competition', as regulation promotes efficient capital markets effects but also sets out to prevent certain market failures.
We argue that the focus on market competition and the fostering of fragmented markets has produced two pronounced effects. One is that marketplaces have become commoditised and are less incentivised to take on broader governance roles in the interests of maintaining market order and stability. Macey and O'Hara 204 argue that market competition has made it too costly for markets to introduce governance structures for vetting issuers and traders, as capturing their fees and rents have become a predominant concern. Further, Yadav 205 also doubts that marketplaces are sufficiently incentivised to invest enough to maintain market order and stability. Under-investment in governance by markets has resulted in a governance gap for overall market order and stability. However, the UK FCA continues to gently nudge dark pools towards optimal self-governing behaviour and prefers a non-intrusive approach. 206 It is questioned whether this is consistent with the forward-looking regulatory approach the UK regulator has adopted. One of the most-cited recent episodes of market instability was the Flash Crash of May 2010 on the New York Stock Exchange where for 30 minutes, a range of securities lost significant market value in a rapid selling episode that depressed their prices. The Flash Crash was attributed to the temporary lack of liquidity in the market for the affected stocks after a large sell order of index futures failed to be executed immediately, forcing a downward spiral of price in a rapid trading environment. 207 It is only after the Flash Crash that the NYSE updated their circuit breakers for the new trading environment, so that trading suspensions can be introduced beyond a certain threshold of abnormal price slide. 208 The belated response in considering the market risks of such trading practices and to put in place appropriate governance and control shows the reluctance of marketplaces to invest in costly governance and control.
Much greater regulatory control over marketplaces in the UK and EU has to an extent attempted to address the governance deficit. The EU Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2014 imposes on all markets the obligation to monitor and detect market abuse, report abnormalities and put in place controls and governance for resilience purposes such as circuit breakers. 209 This regime has been transposed in UK legislation. The MiFID's regime seems to show that persistent regulatory oversight and intervention is a necessary condition for the healthier aspects of market competition to be reaped while controlling for its externalities.
Second, market competition has induced a cultural shift towards emphasis on trading and market arbitrage, disengaging the role of markets from being long-term allocators of investment for the real economy. 210 The support for market competition and the maintenance of short term price efficiency encourages myopic trading and short-termism. 211 The adverse long-term effects and welfaredestruction effects of short termism have been highlighted 212 but continue to be given inadequate consideration in policy development. Regulators, in their overwhelming support for the immediate benefits of market competition have persisted with a quiet trade-off of longer term goals. This inherent bias is something that regulators need to address in considering any regulatory implications for fintech innovation in marketplaces.
The backdrop of regulatory favour for market competition explains to an extent the development of financial innovation in marketplaces focused on achieving more profitable and less risky trading, in the form of algorithmic and high-frequency trading.
Trading Innovations
Profits in finance are increasingly being made in trading as intermediaries act as traders exploiting opportunities for value arbitrage. 213 As mentioned above, short-termist trading is now the norm on financial markets. It could be argued that such short-termist pursuit of price efficiency aligns with long-term allocative welfare. 214 However, if short term prices are not nearly as efficient as one hopes, 215 then short term value arbitraging results in zero gum games that are carried out with complete obliviousness to the impact on the long term. 216 Cautionary voices are however in a minority as policy-makers subject to short-termist democratic politics themselves, are not keen to take stronger stands against the rise of the trading culture. In such a context, trading innovations have flourished, in particular, algorithmic and high frequency trading.
Algorithmic trading involves the use of computer programmed algorithms to execute trades automatically, such programmes embedding certain risk management practices defined by traders. In a simplistic way, this is another technological development that replaces human labour by machines whose programmed executions would be quicker and much more consistent than human judgments. Moreover, with the use of increasingly sophisticated computers, more comprehensive data analytics can inform algorithmic trading. Today's high frequency trading is based on an information processing capacity far exceeding the human capacity, and is able to take place in milliseconds, approaching the speed of light.
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It may be argued that the rise of high frequency trading (HFT) has greatly exacerbated the focus on the trading culture, as traders try to profit from slivers of value arbitrage, driving short-termism to an extreme. 218 Commentators document that high frequency traders embark on a high volume and low margin strategy, which, aided by the speed and the relatively short span of exposure, creates very little risk for traders. For example, traders may enter many passive orders into a market to capture liquidity rebates offered by markets and cancel them very quickly after that so that gains are made without any risky exposure. 219 Another tactic is layering, where many orders at marginally increasing prices are entered and cancelled, resulting in slower traders responding to the increasing bids. The high frequency traders then capture trades at the much higher bids that has been induced by the layering. 220 HFT also involves capturing small advantages in the speed of obtaining market information. For example, many HFT firms rent space very close to exchange servers so that they may obtain a millisecond advantage in public information releases before information arrives at slower markets. This practice is known as co-location. Such information advantage allows HFT firms to gain a trading advantage over the rest of the market. 221 It may be argued that such new forms of competitive innovation should not raise alarm as value arbitrage has been sought by traders long before the advent of such technology. 222 Capital markets are at best semi-strong efficient, so traders have always sought to exploit inefficiencies to make private gains. 223 Such behaviour is not new to human nature. Empirical researchers on HFT also find that markets with HFT participation enjoy beneficial effects, in terms of price discovery 224 and liquidity, 225 though more arguably, lower price volatility. 226 Of course one could argue that the overall market effects, even if beneficial, are at a broad level only. At the micro level, those that have traded with HFTs have been subject to exploitation and worse, predatory trading. The slower trader who transacted with the HFT in a layered market has incurred an adverse selection cost. 227 HFTs that appear to supply constant liquidity are also themselves liquidity takers. 228 HFT has the potential of splitting up large institutional orders to obtain best prices across different markets, but also has the potential of sniffing out large institutional orders in dark pools and executing against them at less than sub-optimal prices for the institutional investor. 229 Although some HFT practices are arguably competitive innovations not involving market abuse, commentators raise questions over (a) the fairness or otherwise of engaging in such innovative advantage; (b) the potential for HFT to sponsor market abuse and (c) how HFT may undermine regulatory objectives such as financial and market stability.
Regulators seem hesitant on making a judgment on (a). As mentioned earlier, HFT has consistently shown to produce beneficial short-term effects in market quality, making prices more efficient and generally providing more and constant liquidity. However, the process of making prices more efficient generally involve exploiting a less-quickly informed or less rapid trader, and the 'unfairness' at the micro transactional level needs to be addressed. 230 The arguments in favour of market efficiency should not totally drown the concerns regarding the ethics of individual 'harms' that are caused. 231 Further, a market that favours the competitive advantage enjoyed by HFT firms would only provoke a socially useless arms race in trading innovation. 232 Commentators urge that certain market practices exacerbate the already unfair advantage HFT firms have and would need to be scrutinised. For example, co-location gives HFT firms an advantage in information although this advantage is open to any who can rent such space. 233 Further, HFTs that subscribe to preferential data feeds that are sent a fraction of a second before such feeds are made for public release also have an arguably unfair information advantage. 234 Exchanges also practice flash orders, ie to allow HFT firms to briefly see an order before it appears on the open market if it is not immediately executable. This again undermines the level playing field in the markets. 235 The SEC's recent fines imposed on Barclays and Credit Suisse could be key to nailing down the undesirable practice of flash orders. 236 The SEC enforcement action was based on the banks' misrepresentation to their investors that their dark pools are fair when they in fact practise flash orders to HFT firms. Although the flash orders were not themselves the subject of enforcement, such enforcement could go some way in articulating a firmer regulatory position about them.
On (b), although the majority of HFT practices are to capture slivers of value arbitrage, the superior technology of HFT can be used towards market abuse and it may be rather difficult to detect such behaviour or pin it down as being abusive. It may be argued that the current regulatory framework should be able to capture HFTs demonstrating anti-social behaviour and market abuse. In this way, HFT is not itself a problem. 237 However, certain HFT practices push the boundaries of current regulatory definitions, such as layering. One could argue that layering is a form of market abuse as it is a rapid version of pump and dump, causing market prices to rise by the layered orders and then seeking to execute at a much higher price at the expense of the counterparty. 238 On the other hand, layering involves rapid cancellation, unlike pump and dump, and so market information is technically not distorted, except that slower traders have not had a chance to process them in such rapid fire. The governance gaps raised by the capabilities of HFT need to be looked into.
Finally, market practices do not merely have transactional and efficiency impact, and could at a broader level affect market and financial stability. Financial stability in particular has been overtly embraced as a key public good and regulatory objective 239 in the wake of the global financial crisis 2008-9. Commentators exhort that it is not sufficient to assume that marketplaces will work optimally, and that the micro-efficiencies in marketplaces will align with wider phenomena such as financial stability. 240 Micro-efficient behaviour could indeed result in pro-cyclical and herding behaviour that is damaging to overall market and financial stability. 241 It is arguable that HFT, which augments micro-efficient behaviour to the hilt, could have a particularly adverse impact on financial stability. HFT is largely automated and may not be able to nimbly respond to abnormal market conditions or significant changes. 242 In such a situation, the rapid trading automation of HFT would exacerbate pro-cyclical actions that could cause already difficult market conditions to more rapidly slide into crisis. 243 In other words, HFT may not be responsible for bringing about difficult market conditions such as a decline in liquidity or falling asset prices. But it could be used to exacerbate them and very rapidly too, making it difficult for interventions to take place for the stabilisation of markets. Thus, the systemic risk impact of HFT trading has been flagged up for scrutiny, 244 and the that the technology is used, governed and controlled in a manner responsible for the maintenance of market and financial stability.
We are also of the view that the relationship between trading innovations and longer term consequences such as long-term allocative efficiency in the real economy and wealth distribution of financial gains must be considered. 245 Otherwise the era of trading innovations would take us into an insular world of micro-efficiency and speed without reference to wider and long-term impact.
Trading innovations such as HFT have not gained a salutary social reputation, 246 and are contributing towards a wider perception that financial elites dominate the financial markets, disempowering and disenfranchising less sophisticated users. 247 Although dynamic innovations in trading technology are being introduced by financial-cumtechnology elites, an increasingly small and alienating group of experts, other fintech innovations arise to challenge such market developments. Alternative markets, which are supported to a certain extent by anti-establishment ideologies, are arising. The next Section turns to a very different market development-private markets denominated in alternative currencies such as bitcoin which is supported by blockchain technology.
Private Alternative Markets-Bitcoin and Blockchain
One of fintech's poster-children would be new digital currencies such as bitcoin supported by the blockchain technology. In essence bitcoin is non-government backed private 'money', which is not regarded as legal tender in most jurisdictions, but is increasingly accepted on a private basis as a means of exchange. 248 The concept of money developed from ancient times as a means of exchange with intrinsic value (such as gold and silver coins) to predominantly a means of exchange backed by sovereigns and law. 249 However, the concept of intrinsic value has not become totally irrelevant as money is used as a means to store value, meaning that its commodity value is still important, but such value has become, for most currencies, reflected in the price that the markets are willing to pay for the currency.
because it is supported by blockchain technology that aims to create the institution and infrastructure for exchange in the real economy.
The technical working of blockchain technology has been extensively documented elsewhere. 251 In brief, it is a distributed ledger technology that maintains a single record of all transactions. Every record of transaction is created by market participants using secure cryptography to ensure that every transaction is initiated and authorised, and then verified and sealed by volunteer software experts (called miners). The record created is then indelible and irreversible. This technology has the potential of bolstering confidence in the ordinary commercial use of bitcoin, as the main risk with the use of such private money, ie fraud and double-spending, 252 is minimised. Supported by blockchain technology, private 'bitcoin-based' economies could arise across borders on the worldwide web, and constitute alternative commercial and financial markets to conventional ones. 253 The development of such alternative markets has attracted some regulatory support 254 as being prima facie not inconsistent with policy-makers' bias towards market competition. However, regulatory response is mixed at the international level, as the 'alternative' nature of such economies necessarily poses some threat to states and regulators. 255 Some commentators see the creation of such a decentralised and private economic phenomenon as truly liberating, as existing political or systemic shackles to economic development could be overcome by the creation of new institutions. It is suggested that the blockchain technology enables new institutional structures such as decentralised autonomous institutions to arise, to replace centrally governed institutions. These decentralised institutions have the potential to be more sophisticated than conventional ones and are automatically coordinating in ways that are efficient. 256 For example, investors in a private 'bitcoin-based' financial investment economy could be freed of the shackles of existing intermediary structures in the financial sector and invest without being subject to extensive principal-agent problems. 257 The private money economy of crypto-currencies and blockchain could truly support development and the unbanked in the developing world. 258 It is also suggested that private money economies such as denominated in bitcoin would develop economies of scale in due course and a lex cryptographia will arise to establish standards of use and behaviour, and dispute resolution, much like the development of the 'law merchant' for international trade from days of old. 259 Private 'bitcoin-based' markets and economies embody for some the utopian ideals of new democracy and not just new commercial opportunities. 260 However, the rise of such alternative private money-based economies faces great challenges. Such alternative economies are fraught with risks relating to the lack of governance, 261 exploitation by fraudsters and criminals 262 and the inherent vulnerabilities of code. 263 Further, participants in such alternative markets and economies must fully bear the market risks of bitcoin. Bitcoin can be subject to hyper-inflation or deflation as its value, 264 not backed by sovereigns and determined in relatively small user markets, can be highly unstable. This could be the Achilles heel of bitcoin-backed alternative markets, making them relatively unscalable. Where such alternative markets remain relatively small and closed, regulatory intervention may be limited and proportionate, targeting fraud, money laundering and terrorist financing, 265 while leaving performance and behaviour issues to resolution by private redress and/or law. Where such alternative markets attain any scale that warrants regulatory attention, then intervention levels could be higher and erode the very private nature of such markets.
Further, governments 266 and established institutions 267 are interested in developing the blockchain technology to enhance existing infrastructure. Hence, the biggest uses of blockchain could be deployed in securities clearing, settlement and custodial functions, or in international payments and transfers made by established financial institutions. Incumbents' adoption of the blockchain technology could overshadow its functions in the private currency-backed markets and create incentives to impede blockchain innovation for such markets. Incumbents could carry out significant investment and coordination among different systems used in different parts of the financial sector, 268 In financial market-places, the key change that took place was led by policy-makers promoting market competition. Although policy-makers could not foresee the 'disruptive' changes that would be brought about by a proliferation of electronic trading venues, this 'managed disruption' took place under a rubric of overarching regulatory principles that supported immediate and salient price transparency, 270 rigorous internal control and governance for markets, 271 obligations imposed on markets to monitor and report abuse swiftly 272 and the trade-through rule in the US highlighted earlier. Many of the positive findings on market quality in the US, UK and EU could be due to such a 'managed disruption' process.
In this light, the rise of dark pools would not be unforeseen, and neither should innovative practices in trading. Current regulatory principles are able to capture within its scope misbehaviour in dark pools. In the UK and EU, rules on best execution, fair and clear investor communication and market abuse are able to address principal-agent abuses, fraudulent and market abuse behaviour. The UK and EU protect retail investors by a best execution rule premised on best consideration, 273 and institutional investors by a best execution rule defined by a range of factors that matter to such investors. 274 The UK has in particular imposed a general principle of fair, clear and not misleading investor communications, 275 and so would be able to reach the same decision as the SEC in enforcing against dark pools that were misrepresented to investors. The UK and EU's market abuse regime is premised on strict liability for having caused distortive effects on the market, 276 and hence the use of HFT that results in those effects can be subject to market abuse enforcement. It however remains to be seen if practices such as layering would be indicted. The EU has introduced ex ante governance of HFT systems by requiring firms to ensure that robust risk controls, business continuity plans and internal governance are in place. Further, an HFT that engages in trading patterns such as making two-way markets in simultaneous orders would be regarded as a market-maker under EU legislation and is obliged to provide liquidity on a predictable basis. 277 Trades that are carried out via algorithmic trading are also required to be reported with that identification, allowing regulatory monitoring of the impact of such trading on markets. 278 Financial markets innovation are consistent with the 'managed disruption' sanctioned by policymakers who have introduced market competition policies. Regulators are generally benign towards such innovation while proportionately protecting stability in markets. The danger however of such a 'managed disruption' process is that there is a policy presumption of favour of competitive market innovations and it could become difficult to persuade policy-makers to deal adequately with suboptimal aspects. The 'unfairness' aspect of co-location or preferential data feeds for HFT firms raised by a number of commentators above are unlikely to be addressed. 279 The adverse selection cost for investors trading on the opposite side of an HFT firm remains a private cost that regulators are unlikely to intervene to address.
The entrenched policy preference for short-term market efficiency as a healthy manifestation of market competition would obscure questions addressed at long-term welfare consequences. Fragmented, competitive markets and a pro-innovation culture in trading cement structural changes in financial marketplaces, making them places for ruthless competition, zero sum games and shorttermist gains. This short-termist trading culture has been lamented in the UK as being contributory to an unhealthy short-termist culture in the corporate sector, 280 increasingly disengaged from investing in the real economy for the long term. 281 Although the UK exhorts institutional investors to behave in a long-termist manner by soft law, 282 and the EU 283 is concerned that institutional investors should account for how they manage their portfolios for the long-term interests of beneficiaries, these concerns seem only tepidly addressed compared to the overwhelming policy support for short-term efficient markets and the trading culture in these markets.
On the 'change' ushered in by private markets or economies denominated in bitcoin, we think such 'change' is slightly less certain in its substitutive potential. Although some regulators are generally supportive in the same pro-competition spirit, they are also ready to intervene if material risks such as money laundering, terrorist financing, fraud and consumer protection become significant issues of concern. 284 The compliance cost for developing such alternative markets at a larger scale could become forbidding. Further, as the blockchain technology can be harnessed by incumbent financial institutions, the increasing proprietisation and forked developments of such technology could create a negative impact for alternative markets denominated in bitcoin. We doubt that such alternative markets or economies are likely to pose a serious substitutive threat 285 but could be allowed to exist
